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Introduction 
For nearly two decades, environmen-
tal justice advocates have charged that 
low-income and minority groups suﬀ er 
a disproportionate burden from environ-
mental risks associated with exposure to 
air, water, and land pollution as well as 
proximity to hazardous waste and other 
pollution generating facilities. Claims of 
these inequities have been ampliﬁ ed by 
a growing social movement that began 
with widely publicized protests in War-
ren County, North Carolina, where a pre-
dominantly black community mobilized 
in large numbers to ﬁ ght the siting of a 
PCB landﬁ ll. Since that time, grassroots 
organizations have sustained and brought 
national attention to the environmental 
justice movement, which is often charac-
terized as a new kind of social campaign 
embodied by the convergence of civil 
rights and environmental activism. Gov-
ernment at all levels have taken notice 
of environmental justice concerns, and 
responded with a variety of initiatives to 
these inequities (real and perceived). 
Th is policy report brieﬂ y summarizes new 
research that examines an understudied 
dimension of the environmental justice 
argument: that government behavior 
contributes to the alleged inequities.1 
Environmental Justice in 
Government Behavior? 
Environmental justice advocates have 
long-maintained that government imple-
mentation and enforcement of pollu-
tion control laws and regulations is bi-
ased against minorities and low-income 
populations.  Robert Bullard, one of the 
foremost voices of the movement, has 
suggested that “environmental racism” 
extends to the implementation and en-
forcement of environmental laws and 
regulations2  and criticized these govern-
mental practices for being “unfair, un-
just, and illegal.”3   Th is is an important 
claim. While there is now a solid body 
of evidence suggesting that minority and 
low-income groups face disproportion-
ate environmental burdens, additional 
evidence of race- or class-based dispari-
ties in government performance would 
mean that environmental inequities are 
no longer only a matter of private sector 
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* Th is policy report is based on analysis described in more detail in Konisky, 2009.
1 At the federal level, the Clinton Administration made environmental justice issues a top environmental policy priority, creating an Oﬃ  ce 
of Environmental Justice within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and signing Executive Order 12898 which required all 
federal agencies to address any environmental inequities resulting from their policies, programs, and activities. State and local governments 
also responded to environmental justice concerns, advancing many initiatives aimed at remedying racial and class inequities in the distribu-
tion of environmental hazards.
2 Bullard, 1993.
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decision-making, but also of government behavior.
Despite claims of unequal protection and discrimina-
tory practices, only a handful of studies have directly 
examined environmental justice in the context of gov-
ernment behavior. Most of this work has sought to an-
swer the question of whether civil judicial penalties (i.e. 
ﬁ nes) issued as part of federal district court decisions for 
noncompliance with environmental laws diﬀ er depend-
ing on the racial and socioeconomic composition of 
communities in which oﬀ ending facilities are located. 
Results from these studies are mixed, with some ﬁ nd-
ing that penalties are lower in minority and low income 
communities,4  and others ﬁ nding no meaningful dif-
ferences across communities.5 
  
Although federal district court outcomes are an impor-
tant piece of environmental enforcement, these deci-
sions are not the only type of government behavior with 
possible environmental justice implications.  Speciﬁ -
cally, there may still be disparities at other stages of the 
environmental regulatory enforcement process, includ-
ing fewer compliance monitoring inspections and fewer 
punitive actions to bring violating facilities back into 
compliance.  In the discussion that follows, we summa-
rize the ﬁ ndings from new research that explicitly tests 
for race- and/or class-based inequities in these types of 
regulatory enforcement actions. 
Testing for Inequities in Enforcement 
Konisky (2009) examines state environmental regulato-
ry enforcement from 1985-2000 to determine whether 
state governments systematically perform fewer enforce-
ment actions in areas with comparatively high minority 
and low-income populations.  Th e study analyzes state 
enforcement of three federal pollution control pro-
grams: the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA).6   
In the study, Konisky estimates a series of event count 
models to analyze the relationship between the number 
of enforcement actions performed by state governments 
and the demographic composition of counties.  Th e 
dependent variables in the analysis are the unweighted 
sums of enforcement actions (i.e., inspections, notices 
of violation, punitive measures) taken by state govern-
ments under the three federal environmental laws. Th e 
independent variables are measures of race and income 
complied from the U.S. Census Bureau. To isolate the 
eﬀ ects of the racial and socioeconomic composition of 
counties, the study controls for various social, political, 
and economic demographics typically used in environ-
mental justice studies.7  Th e county-year is the unit of 
analysis.8 
Table : Estimated Effects of Class on State 
Environemental Enforcement
Program Percent Change
Percent Change 
for Standard 
Deviation 
Change
Percent Poverty
CAA
CWA
RCRA
-2.3
-1.4
-5.4
-16.0
-8.8
-34.0
Median Household Income
CAA
CWA
RCRA
3.3
-0.7
3.3
31.9
-5.9
33.1
Results from the study are largely consistent across the 
three pollution control programs analyzed.9  With re-
spect to class-based disparities, there is strong evidence 
that state governments performed fewer enforcement 
actions in communities with higher levels of poverty 
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3Bullard and Johnson, 2000.
4Lavelle and Coyle, 1992 and Lynch et al., 2004.
5Ringquist, 1998 and Atlas, 2001.
6State enforcement of these programs is the appropriate level of analysis.  Each of the programs studied is designed within a model of 
regulatory federalism and partial preemption, under which the EPA delegate states the authority to implement and enforce the federal 
programs.
7Control variables include: % Voter turnout, % College educated, % Owner occupied housing, number of regulated establishments, 
manufacturing employment, population, land area, population density, county nonattainment status (for the CAA only), whether the 
county borders another political jurisdiction, and EPA monitoring inspections.
8A county-level analysis is adopted because the geographical data needed to precisely locate the hundreds of thousands of facilities histori-
cally regulated under the CAA, the CWA, and the RCRA is unavailable.
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and lower median household incomes. Table 1 reports 
the estimated eﬀ ects of poverty and median house-
hold income on state enforcement, both in terms of a 
percent change and percent change for a standard de-
viation change.10   With respect to poverty, the eﬀ ects 
range from about a 2 percent to 5 percent reduction in 
the amount of enforcement for each percentage increase 
in poverty.  Th e results are similar for median house-
hold income in counties in the case of the CAA and the 
RCRA.  
Figure 1 further illustrates the eﬀ ects of poverty on state 
enforcement, by considering the relationship across the 
full distribution of county-level poverty (holding the 
rest of the variables at their means).  Th e graph clearly 
shows the sharp decline in the predicted number of 
state enforcements as the percentage of county popula-
tion living in poverty increases.  
Figure . Relationship between Poverty and State 
Enforcement Actions Conducted in Counties
Once controlling for income, there is not a statistically 
signiﬁ cant relationship between race and state enforce-
ment of pollution control laws.11  Th is ﬁ nding diﬀ ers 
from much of the environmental justice research that 
examines the attributes of communities living near 
noxious facilities which has found race-based inequities 
to be even more prevalent than those based on class. 
Th ese results, however, should be interpreted with care. 
It is possible that the high correlation between race and 
poverty makes it diﬃ  cult to tease out their independent 
eﬀ ects. Additionally, the county-level analysis assumes 
that the racial composition of counties is evenly distrib-
uted, which may not be the case in some counties. 
Conclusion
Th e study summarized here represents the ﬁ rst large-
scale assessment of whether class- or race based dispari-
ties in environmental protection extend to regulatory 
enforcement behavior. Although there is little evidence 
of race-based disparities in state enforcement of environ-
mental laws, there is strong evidence supporting claims 
made by environmental justice advocates that govern-
ments disproportionately enforce environmental laws 
in low-income communities. While the magnitude of 
the eﬀ ects are sizable, the ﬁ ndings suggest that changes 
in government behavior may help remedy or at least re-
duce observed disparities, since regulatory enforcement 
is a policy tool that government has the authority and 
capacity to modify to redress environmental inequities. 
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